The SUSE Security Team Blog has a post
with an analysis of seunshare,
which is used by SELinux to confine untrusted programs. During a
review of version
3.10 of the program, the team identified two local
Denial-of-Service (DoS) vectors.

Since seunshare is supposed to run on SELinux-enabled systems, it
is important to understand what kind of privilege escalation can be
achieved when vulnerabilities are exploited in a setuid-root binary
like this. Many SELinux-enabled systems, such as Fedora and openSUSE,
ship with the "targeted" SELinux policy by default. This policy is
focused on confining well-known system services, but assigns an
unconfined SELinux context to interactive users by default to achieve
a balance between security and usability.

There is currently no domain transition from the unconfined domain
to the more restricted seunshare_t defined in the SELinux policy for
seunshare. This means the execution of seunshare continues in the
unconfined domain. Thus in the context of attacks carried out by
interactive users, the impact of the vulnerabilities below will be a
root-like privilege escalation despite the system running in SELinux
enforced mode.

See the post for the full write-up of the team's discoveries and timeline. The
vulnerabilities have been fixed in version�3.11.

https://lwn.net/Articles/1083076/
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